Debugging, Recording,
and Replaying Attestation Checks
Whenever the actual attestation check fails (i.e., whenever onAttestationError() is called), a ready-made WardenDebugAttestationStatement is created and passed to this function.
Hence, two pieces of information are available to aid debugging:
- The attestation error (as the receiver of this lambda)
- The debug statement, which can be exported for offline analysis
Debugging Integrated Attestation
The WardenDebugAttestationStatement can be serialised to JSON by invoking .serialize() (or serializeCompact()) on it.
It can later be deserialised by calling deserialize() (or deserializeCompact()) on its companion.
By finally calling replay() on such a deserialised debug info object, the whole attestation verification process is replayed.
Attaching a debugger allows for step-by-step debugging of any attestation errors encountered. For the most straightforward debugging experience:
- Import this project into IntelliJ IDEA
- Add a breakpoint here (line 19)
- Run it in debug mode
Just be sure to add a single argument pointing to a file as described in Diag.kt!
Debugging Raw Android Attestations
A similar utility exists for printing the contents of an Android attestation statement, located in /utils/roboto-diag. More specifically, it pretty-prints the contents of the leaf certificate's Android attestation extension and expects either:
-f path/to/leaf/certificate.pem- a base64-encoded certificate as the sole argument
It will then pretty-print the attestation extension's contents.
Stand-Alone Attestation Parser
To use androidAttestationExtension on all platforms (e.g., to implement client-side checks on Android),
include at.asitplus.warden:supreme-common in your project, and you are ready to go!
As an added bonus, there is a nullable androidAttestationExtension extension property on the Java X509Certificate
and on Signum's X509Certificate class (and certificate chains), which exposes the prettyPrint() function so you can peek into Android attestation extensions at any time.
It will even parse malformed values and print those malformed values' DER-encoded hex representation.
The underlying parser and the renderer are still experimental, so your mileage may vary.
However, it has been tested against literally thousands of attestation proofs captured from real devices and
seems to be more robust than Google's parsers, old and new.
Plus, its prettyPrint is a huge improvement over relying solely on ParsedAttestationRecord for debugging.
Example of a Pretty-Printed Attestation Record from an Emulator
AttestationKeyDescription(
attestationVersion = 3
attestationSecurityLevel = TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT
keyMintVersion = 41
keyMintSecurityLevel = TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT
attestationChallenge = b5a4a68423c5d2f610328b3dcc8b408d352afc78fb7eb0d4803bd9ef581654eb
uniqueId =
softwareEnforced =
AuthorizationList(
purpose = null
algorithm = null
keySize = null
blockMode = null
digest = null
padding = null
callerNonce = false
minMacLength = null
ecCurve = null
rsaPublicExponent = null
mgfDigest = null
rollbackResistance = false
earlyBootOnly = false
activeDateTime = null
originationExpireDateTime = null
usageExpireDateTime = null
usageCountLimit = null
userSecureId = null
noAuthRequired = false
userAuthType = null
authTimeout = null
allowWhileOnBody = false
trustedUserPresenceRequired = false
trustedConfirmationRequired = false
unlockedDeviceRequired = false
allApplications = false
creationDateTime = CreationDateTime(intValue=1752703332000, timestamp=2025-07-16T22:02:12Z)
origin = null
rollbackResistant = null
rootOfTrust = null
osVersion = null
osPatchLevel = null
attestationApplicationId =
AttestationApplicationId(
packageInfos = [
AttestationPackageInfo(packageName='at.asitplus.atttest', version=1)
]
signatureDigests = [
34b9762c4d6c90d48431940c57bde7314258b26420efe16ac7f7274f0d330ad5
]
)
attestationIdBrand = null
attestationIdDevice = null
attestationIdProduct = null
attestationIdSerial = null
attestationIdImei = null
attestationIdMeid = null
attestationIdManufacturer = null
attestationIdModel = null
vendorPatchLevel = null
bootPatchLevel = null
deviceUniqueAttestation = false
attestationIdSecondImei = null
moduleHash = null
)
hardwareEnforced =
AuthorizationList(
purpose = [
- SIGN
- VERIFY
]
algorithm = EC
keySize = KeySize(intValue=256)
blockMode = null
digest = [
- SHA_2_256
]
padding = null
callerNonce = false
minMacLength = null
ecCurve = P_256
rsaPublicExponent = null
mgfDigest = null
rollbackResistance = false
earlyBootOnly = false
activeDateTime = null
originationExpireDateTime = null
usageExpireDateTime = null
usageCountLimit = null
userSecureId = null
noAuthRequired = false
userAuthType = UserAuth(authTypes=[FINGERPRINT], intValue=2)
authTimeout = null
allowWhileOnBody = false
trustedUserPresenceRequired = false
trustedConfirmationRequired = false
unlockedDeviceRequired = false
allApplications = false
creationDateTime = null
origin = GENERATED
rollbackResistant = null
rootOfTrust =
RootOfTrust(
verifiedBootKeyDigest=c2224571c9cd5c89200a7311b1e37aa9cf751e2e19753e8d3702bca00be1d42c
deviceLocked=true
verifiedBootState=Verified
verifiedBootHash=d415abd0e620d3e8a942a62920195ad893ff0515ab8236931a156bc1f49de444
)
osVersion = OsVersion(major=13, minor=0, sub=0, intValue=130000)
osPatchLevel = OsPatchLevel(year=2025, month=MAY, intValue=202505)
attestationApplicationId = null
attestationIdBrand = null
attestationIdDevice = null
attestationIdProduct = null
attestationIdSerial = null
attestationIdImei = null
attestationIdMeid = null
attestationIdManufacturer = null
attestationIdModel = null
vendorPatchLevel = PatchLevel(year=2025, month=MAY, day=1, intValue=20250501)
bootPatchLevel = PatchLevel(year=2025, month=MAY, day=1, intValue=20250501)
deviceUniqueAttestation = false
attestationIdSecondImei = null
moduleHash = null
)
)